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STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES IN A NON-MARKOVIAN
SETTING ∗
ERHAN BAYRAKTAR † AND H. VINCENT POOR ‡
Abstract. Stochastic differential games are considered in a non-Markovian setting. Typically, in
stochastic differential games the modulating process of the diffusion equation describing the state flow
is taken to be Markovian. Then Nash equilibria or other types of solution such as Pareto equilibria are
constructed using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations. But in a non-Markovian setting the
HJB method is not applicable. To examine the non-Markovian case, this paper considers the situation
in which the modulating process is a fractional Brownian motion. Fractional noise calculus is used
for such models to find the Nash equilibria explicitly. Although fractional Brownian motion is taken
as the modulating process because of its versatility in modeling in the fields of finance and networks,
the approach in this paper has the merit of being applicable to more general Gaussian stochastic
differential games with only slight conceptual modifications. This work has applications in finance
to stock price modeling which incorporates the effect of institutional investors, and to stochastic
differential portfolio games in markets in which the stock prices follow diffusions modulated with
fractional Brownian motion.
AMS subject classifications. 91A15, 91A23, 60G15, 60G18, 60H40
Key words. Stochastic Differential Games, non-Markovian Games, Fractional Brownian Mo-
tion, Fractional Noise Theory.
1. Introduction. The study of stochastic differential games with controls is a
part of game theory that is relatively unknown, even though it has significant potential
for application as noted by Øksendal and Reikvam [29]. Prior work in this area has
focused on the examination of such games in a Markovian setting (see below). In
this paper we will study a type of non-Markovian stochastic differential game. In
particular, we will consider a game in which the one-dimensional state Xt follows the
following stochastic differential equation:
dXt = µ(t,Xt, υ1, ..., υN)dt+ σ(t,Xt, υ1, ..., υN )dB
(H)
t , (1.1)
µ : [0, T ]× IR×Υ1 × ...×ΥN → IR, (1.2)
σ : [0, T ]× IR×Υ1 × ...×ΥN → IR, (1.3)
where υi ∈ Υi ⊂ IRνi is the control of the ith player over the state and is adapted
to the natural filtration of BH . Here T is the expiration date of the game, and BH
is a fractional Brownian motion (fBm) with Hurst parameter H ∈ (12 , 1). BH is
defined as an almost surely (a.s.) continuous zero mean Gaussian process having the
autocorrelation structure given by
E
{
BHt B
H
s
}
=
1
2
{|s|2H + |t|2H − |t− s|2H} (1.4)
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Each agent wants to maximize its own pay-off (with this feature the problem differs
from the usual optimal control problem):
Ji(x) = E
x
{∫ T
0
fi(t,Xt, υt)dt+Ki(T,XT )
}
, (1.5)
where Ex{·} denotes conditional expectation given X0 = x. In this paper we consider
only the case in which the state and the source of randomness are one-dimensional.
The results can be extended to the case in which there are multiple sources of ran-
domness and multiple controlled states (see [4]).
Typically in this type of setting the modulating process in (1.1) is taken to be
Brownian motion, i.e., H = 1/2 and the controls of the players are Markovian. Then
Nash equilibria or other types of solution such as Pareto equilibria are constructed
using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations. (See e.g. Friedman [10], Gaidov
[12], [13], [11] Nilakantan [25], Øksendal and Reikvam [29], and Pravin [34].) However,
fBm is not a Markov process for any H other than 12 , and therefore this approach
does not work for the general case of (1.1). Here we will develop a quasi-martingale
approach to the solution of this problem using the fractional noise calculus developed
by Duncan et al. [8], and Øksendal and Hu [17] which generalizes white noise calculus
(see [20]) to develop an integration theory with respect to fBm. The key to our
solution will be the fractional Clark-Ocone formula developed by Øksendal and Hu
[17]. The integrals in (1.1) are Wick type integrals (see Definition 3.3) rather than
Stieltjes integrals (defined pathwise; see e.g. [35]). The motivation for using Wick
type integrals is as follows: The pathwise integral
∫ t
0
fsδB
H
s with respect to fBm does
not in general have zero mean, i.e. E
{∫ t
0 fsδB
H
s
}
6= 0. However the Wick type
integral
∫ t
0
fsdB
H
s has zero mean, i.e. E
{∫ t
0
fsdB
H
s
}
= 0. Therefore in a stochastic
differential equation (SDE) of the form
dXt = b(Xt)dt+ σ(Xt)dB
H
t , (1.6)
the volatility term σ(Xt)dB
H
t does not contribute to the mean rate of change, as it
does in SDE’s defined by pathwise integrals. Since seperating the random fluctuations
from the mean rate of change is desirable for our purposes, we prefer to use Wick
type integrals for defining the integrals with respect to fBm (see [8]). (Note also that
only in the Wick type calculus are the standard tools of Itoˆ calculus, such as an Itoˆ
representation theorem, available.) See [6] for applications of Wick calculus to pricing
weather derivatives, and [9] and [17] for further applications of Wick type calculus
particularly in finance.
Fractional noise calculus reduces to white noise calculus when H is replaced by
1/2. Moreover the integrals of adapted processes in this framework are equal to the
Itoˆ integrals of these procesess with respect to Brownian motion. Hence our results
hold in particular for the standard framework, i.e. when the modulator is a Brownian
motion, and the integrals in (1.1) are taken to be Itoˆ integrals.
This work has an immediate application in finance, to stock price modeling when
long-range dependence is accounted for in the model. The stock prices are considered
to be states in this setting while the agents are not price takers, i.e. their trading
change the price level. This models a market with institutional investors who make
large transactions and therefore influence prices. These investors find themselves in a
random environment due to the existence of small investors. The small investors are
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typically inert, that is they do not trade for long time intervals. A micro-structure
model taking the inertness of the agents into account is constructed in [2]. It is shown
that the prices arising from the interaction of the small agents can be approximated
by geometric fractional Brownian motion. The game theoretic setting in this paper
is an extension to the results of [2] in the sense that, we start by assuming that the
noise in the environment can be modeled by an fBm differential in the controlled
stochastic differential equation (1.1), which models the noise due to the trades of the
small investors.
Another possible application is stochastic differential portfolio games, which are
studied by Browne in a Brownian motion setting in [7]. This formulation is applicable
to the analysis of traders who are competing for a bonus, or to fund managers whose
funds are invested in different markets, and who achieve rewards based on the relative
performance of their funds. Yet another possible application is in stochastic goodwill
problems (finding the optimal advertising policy for the maximization of product im-
age) in advertising when there is more than one good of the same kind in competition.
(See [24] for stochastic goodwill problems in a stochastic optimal control setting.)
By adapting the fractional noise machinery, our results will hold for more general
Gaussian modulators in the state flow dynamics.
However we state the results in terms of fBm to emphasize the fact that the
game under consideration becomes non-Markovian, and also because this case admits
an explicit equilibrium. Another motivation for this model is the fact that fBm is
frequently used for modeling in various areas of research (see [3], [5] for applications
in finance and [1], [33], [26], [27], [28] for applications other than finance).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a Nash-
equilibrium theorem. In Section 3 we introduce the necessary tools from the fractional
noise calculus that we use in the proof of the equilibrium theorem in Section 4. Finally
in Section 5 we give a sketch of how to extend the fractional noise machinery to more
general Gaussian modulation processes.
2. Nash Equilibrium in a Linear Game of N players. For ease of exposi-
tion we consider first a one dimensional state equation, with the drift and diffusion
coefficients controlled linearly by the players:
dXt = rXtdt+
N∑
i=1
αi(t)ui(t)dt+ C
N∑
i=1
βi(t)vi(t)dt+
N∑
i=1
βi(t)vi(t)dB
H(t), (2.1)
where BH denotes the one-dimensional version of B(H) with H1 = H . The initial
state will be denoted by X0 = x. The pay-off function of player i will be of the form:
Ji(x) = E
x
µ
{∫ T
0
ciu
γi
i (t)
γi
dt+
biX
γ′i
T
γ′i
}
; (2.2)
that is, players are constant relative risk averse (CRRA). Here µ is the measure on
the sample space under which the canonical process is an fBm. Player i controls the
state by its choice of actions (ui, vi). We assume that αi : [0, T ] → IR is bounded
for each i ∈ {1, ..., N}. The coefficients functions βi : [0, T ] → IR will appear in the
definition of admissible strategies.
Since this game is in a non-Markovian setting, it cannot be solved via the HJB
method. Instead, as noted in Section 1, we will employ the recently developed frac-
tional Wick calculus, which we describe briefly in Section 3 and the fractional Clark-
Ocone formula (which is given along with the proof of the equilibrium theorem) to
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find Nash equilibria for this game. Observe that ui affects the drift of the state and
also appears in the pay-off function. It can be interpreted as a cost for the player, i.e.
for gaining a certain amount of riskless increase the player pays an associated cost.
Whereas by choice of vi the player does not have to pay a cost for an associated gain
(since this action does not appear in the pay-off function), but it must take some risk
(since vi affects the diffusion coefficient in addition to the drift).
Let us introduce the following notation which is necessary to define the admissible
strategies and for the statement of the theorem.
Define K as
K(t) =
C(T t− t2) 12−H
2H(2H − 1)Γ(2H − 1)Γ(2− 2H) cos(π(H − 12 ))
, for t ∈ [0, T ], (2.3)
and define ζ by(
(−∆)−(H−1/2)ζt
)
(s) =
(
(−∆)−(H−1/2)K)(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t,
ζt(s) = 0 s < 0 or s > t,
(2.4)
where the operator (−∆)−(H−1/2) operates on a test function f as
(
(−∆)−(H−1/2)f)(x) = 1
2Γ(2H − 1) cos(π(H − 1/2))
∫ ∞
−∞
|x− t|2H−2f(t)dt. (2.5)
where Γ is the gamma function and is given by Γ(x) =
∫∞
0
tx−1e−tdt for x > 0. The
existence of such ζ is guaranteed by [16].
Define µˆ and η by
η(T ) :=
dµˆ
dµ
:= exp
(
−
∫ T
0
K(s)dBHs −
1
2
|K|2φ
)
, (2.6)
where |K|2φ is given by |K|2φ =
∫
IR2
+
K(s)K(t)φ(s, t)dsdt, and where
φ(s, t) = H(2H − 1)|s− t|2H−2; s, t ∈ IR+. (2.7)
Here µ denotes the probability measure under which BH is an fBm with Hurst pa-
rameter H . Note that integrals of deterministic functions with respect to (w.r.t) fBm
are well defined, as will become clear in Section 3.
And finally define ρ by ρ(t, w) := Eµ
{
η(T )
∣∣Ft}, where Ft is the σ-algebra gener-
ated by {BHs , s ≤ t}.
Now we will introduce the solution concept of Nash equilibrium in our context.
We consider a set A = A1×...×AN of admissible strategies for which the admissibility
conditions are adaptedness w.r.t. the filtration generated by fBm and the following
integrability condition
βivi ∈ L1,2φ (µˆ), (2.8)
where L1,2φ (µˆ) denotes the completion of the set of all Ft adapted processes f such
that
‖ f ‖L1,2
φ
(µˆ):= Eµˆ
{∫
IR
∫
IR
f(s)f(t)φ(s, t)dsdt
}
+ Eµˆ
{(∫
IR
Dφs f(s)ds
)2}
<∞.
(2.9)
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Here DφsF =
∫
IR
φ(s, t)DtFdt, where DsF denotes the Hida-Malliavin derivative of
F , which will be introduced in Section 3.
Definition 2.1. The strategy ze = (ue, ve) ∈ A is called a Nash-equilibrium
strategy if, for each i, player i’s action zei = (ui, vi) ∈ Ai is a best response to its
opponents, i.e.
Jxi (z
e
1 , ..., z
e
i−1, zi, z
e
i+1, ..., z
e
N ) ≤ Jxi (ze), (2.10)
for all x, for each player i and for all zi ∈ Ai.
Then we have the following Nash equilibrium theorem:
Theorem 2.2. Consider the game given by (2.1) and (2.2). Then the following
conditions ((2.11), (2.12)) are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a Nash-
equilibrium:
γ′i = γ
′ for i = 1, ..., N, and (2.11)
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
m
1
γi−1 b
1
γi−1
i αi(t)
γi
γi−1 e
−rt γi
γi−1 exp
(
γi
2(1− γi)2 |ζt|φ
)
dt
+m
1
γ′−1 e
−rT γ′
γ′−1 exp
(
2γ′|K|φ
2(1− γ′)2
)
= x,
(2.12)
has a solution m∗ ∈ IR.
Let
(
(ue1, v
e
1), ...., (u
e
N , v
e
N )
)
denote the agents’ Nash-equilibrium strategies. The
first components of the equilibrium strategies are uniquely determined by
uei (t) =
(
m∗biαi(t)
ci
e−rtρ(t, w)
) 1
γi−1
, for i = 1, ..., N, (2.13)
while the second component of the players’ strategies will be any adapted (to the fil-
tration of fBm) processes satisfying the following constraint:
e−rt
N∑
i=1
βiv
e
i (t) = (m
∗)
1
γ′−1
K(t)
1− γ′ exp
(
1
1− γ′
∫ t
0
K(s)dBHs −
C
1− γ′
∫ T
t
K(s)ds
+
2− γ
2(1− γ2) |K|
2
φ −
1
1− γ |K1[0,t]|
2
φ − rT
γ′
γ′ − 1
)
−
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
αi(u)
γi
γi−1
(m∗bi
ci
) 1
γi−1
× ζu(t)
1− γi e
−ru γi
γi−1 exp
(
1
1− γi
∫ t
0
ζu(s)dB
H
s −
C
1− γi
∫ u
t
ζu(s)ds
+
2− γi
2(1− γi)2 |ζu|
2
φ −
1
1− γi |ζu1[0,t]|
2
φ
)
du,
(2.14)
where 1 stands for the indicator function. Finally, the state at time T at Nash equi-
librium is given by
F e = (m∗)
1
γ′−1 η(T )
1
γ′−1 e
−rT
γ′−1 . (2.15)
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These results can be extended to games with multiple numbers of controlled states
and multiple sources of randomness (see [4]).
Before proving Theorem 2.2 we will, in the next section, give a brief review of
basic results from fractional noise calculus, mostly following the treatment by Hu and
Øksendal [17]. (An extended version of the following section can be found in [4].) 1
3. Fractional Noise Calculus. We will start this section by introducing the
necessary ingredients for the definition of the the stochastic integral in (1.1). In what
follows L2φ(IR) will denote the completion of the set of measurable functions satisfying
|f |2φ :=
∫
IR2
f(s)f(t)φ(s, t)dsdt <∞. (3.1)
Remark : It is shown by Taqqu and Pipiras [30] that the set of functions satisfying
(3.1) is not a complete space.
The stochastic integrals of deterministic functions in L2φ(IR) w.r.t. fBm are well
defined (see [14]). For f ∈ L2φ(IR), we will denote its integral w.r.t fBm by < w, f >:=∫
IR
f(t)dBHt .
The probability space in our game will be Ω = S ′(R), the space of tempered
distributions (the dual space of S(IR), the Schwarz space of rapidly decreasing func-
tions) equipped with the weak-star topology. And we will take the events to be Borel
subsets of S ′(R). By the Bochner-Minlos theorem there exists a probability measure
µ on Ω such that, < ·, f >: Ω→ IR is a Gaussian random variable with mean 0, and
variance |f |2φ (see [17]).
We will now introduce the Wiener chaos expansion of random variables in L2(µ).
We first must find the orthonormal basis for L2φ(IR). Recall that the Hermite functions
(see e.g. Appendix C of [15]), which we will denote by (zn), form an orthonormal
basis for L2(IR).
Let us define the map from the space of functions satisfying (3.1) into L2(IR) by
(Iφf)(u) = cH
∫ ∞
u
(t− u)H− 32 f(t)dt, (3.2)
where cH =
√
H(2H−1)Γ( 3
2
−H)
Γ(H− 1
2
)Γ(2−2H) (here, as before, Γ denotes the gamma function). This
map preserves the inner product, and the Hermite functions are in the range of this
map. Let I−1φ denote the inverse map of Iφ. (For summable functions this inverse
exists and is proportional to the Liouville differential of order H − 12 [32], since Iφ(f)
is proportional to the fractional integral of f of order H − 12 .) Now we see that the
set (en = I
−1
φ (zn))n=1,2,... constitutes an orthonormal basis for L
2
φ(IR).
Let J denote the set of all (finite) multi-indices of non-negative integers. Then
for α = (α1, α2, ..., αm) ∈ J , define
Hα(w) := hα1(< w, e1 >)...hαm(< w, em >). (3.3)
Note that Eµ{HαHβ} = 0 if α 6= β, and Eµ{H2α} = α!. Now we can state what
is known as the chaos decomposition for the elements of L2(µ) (see [17]): Every
1Although the original name given by Hu and Øksendal in [17] to this kind of calculus was frac-
tional white noise calculus, we prefer to omit ’white’ from the name since white suggests independence
at each point in time, and here the noise considered does not have this property.
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F ∈ L2(µ) can be decomposed uniquely as F (w) =∑α∈J cαHα(w) where cα ∈ IR for
all α ∈ J .
For defining the integration w.r.t fBm of random functions we will make use of
the Hida test function space (a subspace of L2(µ)), and Hida distribution space (a
superset of L2(µ)) which we denote by (S)H and (S)∗H respectively. (See [36] for the
definitions of these two spaces.) Let ψ(w) =
∑
α∈J aαHα(w) ∈ (S)H and G(w) =∑
β∈J bβHβ(w), and denote the action of G on ψ by << G,ψ >>:=
∑
α∈J α!aαbα.
For defining the integral w.r.t fBm it is necessary to define (S)∗H -valued Pettis
integrals as follows.
Definition 3.1. A function Z : IR→ (S)∗H is (S)∗H integrable if << Z(t), ψ >>∈
L1(IR) for all ψ ∈ (S)H . In this case, the (S)∗H integral of Z, denoted by
∫
IR
Z(t)dt,
is the unique element in (S)∗H such that
<<
∫
IR
Z(t)dt, ψ >>=
∫
IR
<< Z(t), ψ >> dt, for all ψ ∈ (S)H . (3.4)
Remark: t → BHt is differentiable in (S)∗H , i.e. fractional noise is a well-defined
object and we denote it by (WHt ).
Below we describe the Wick product which is the last ingredient necessary for
describing the integration w.r.t fBm.
Definition 3.2. Suppose F,G ∈ (S)∗H are given by
F (w) =
∑
α∈J
aαHα(w) and G(w) =
∑
β∈J
bβHβ(w). (3.5)
Then the Wick product F ⋄G of F and G is defined as
(F ⋄G)(w) =
∑
α,β∈J
aαbβHα+β(w). (3.6)
Remark : (S)H , and (S)∗H are closed under Wick product.
The Wick exponential exp⋄ is defined as exp⋄(X) =
∑∞
n=0
X⋄n
n! , provided the
series converges in (S)∗H , where X⋄n = X ⋄ ... ⋄ X (n factors). And we have that
exp⋄ (< w, f >) = exp
(
< w, f > − 12 |f |2φ
)
, for f ∈ L2φ(IR) (see [17]).
Definition 3.3. Suppose Y : IR→ (S)∗H is such that Y (t) ⋄WHt is integrable in
(S)∗H . Then
∫
IR Y (t)dB
H
t is defined by∫
IR
Y (t)dBHt :=
∫
IR
Y (t) ⋄WHt dt. (3.7)
Lemma 3.4. Let L1,2φ (µ) be as in (2.9). If Y ∈ L1,2φ (µ), then
∫
IR
YtdB
H
t exists as
an element of L2(µ) and its norm is given by ‖ Y ‖L1,2
φ
(µ).
For finding the equilibrium strategies we also make use of the Hida derivative
(which is called the Malliavin derivative in the context of Wiener space) which we
will define below. We first define the directional derivative:
Definition 3.5. Suppose that F : S ′ → IR and γ ∈ S ′. Then the directional
(Gateaux) derivative of F in the direction of γ is given by
DγF (w) := lim
ǫ→0
F (w + ǫγ)− F (w)
ǫ
, if it exists in (S)∗H . (3.8)
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Definition 3.6. F : S ′ → IR is said to be differentiable if there is a map K : IR→
(S)∗H such that
K(t, w)γ(t) is (S)∗H integrable
and DγF (w) =
∫
IR
K(t, w)γ(t)dt for all γ ∈ L2(IR). (3.9)
Then DtF (w) := K(t, w) is said to be the Hida derivative of F .
We will make use of the Pothoff-Timpel test functions and distributions (see [31] for
the definitions of these objects) to define quasi-conditional expectation in the following
sections. We denote these spaces by G and G∗ respectively. The Hida derivative of
the random variables in G∗ exist.
Let F =
∑
α cαHα(w) ∈ G∗. Then the Hida derivative exists and is given by
DtF (w) =
∑
α
cα
∑
i
αiHα−εi(w)ei(t), (3.10)
where εi = (0, ..., 0, 1, 0, ..., 0) with the 1 in the ith component.
We proceed by defining the quasi-conditional expectation and then introducing
the fractional Clark-Ocone theorem which will be crucial in reducing the dynamic
optimization problems of the next section into static optimization problems.
Definition 3.7. [17] If F ∈ G∗(µ) has the following expansion
F (w) =
∞∑
n=0
∫
[0,T ]n
fn(dB
H)⊗n, (3.11)
then its quasi-conditional expectation is given by
E˜µ
{
F
∣∣Ft} = ∞∑
n=0
∫
[0,t]n
fn(dB
H)⊗n. (3.12)
Note that E˜µ
{
F
∣∣Ft} 6= Eµ{F ∣∣Ft} in general. (Only for H = 12 is the quasi-
conditional expectation operator the same as the conditional expectation operator on
L2(µ).) However the following holds: E˜
{
F
∣∣Ft} = F a.s.⇔ F is Ft measurable.
The following feature of the quasi-conditional expectation will be helpful in the
computations in the next section:
E˜{F ⋄G|Ft} = E˜{F |Ft} ⋄ E˜{G|Ft} for F,G ∈ G∗. (3.13)
We will also need the notion of a quasi-martingale which is defined as follows:
Definition 3.8. Suppose Mt is an (Ft) adapted process in G∗. It is called a
quasi-martingale if
E˜
{
Mt
∣∣Fs} =Ms, for all t ≥ s. (3.14)
Lemma 3.9. [18] Let F ∈ L1,2φ (µ). Then Mt =
∫ t
0
FsdB
H
s is a quasi-martingale.
Now we can state the fractional Clark-Ocone theorem.
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Theorem 3.10. [17] Suppose G(w) ∈ L2(µ) is FT measurable. Define ψ(t, w) =
E˜µ
{
DtG
∣∣Ft}, where DtG is the Hida derivative of G at t, which exists as an element
of G∗(µ). Then ψ ∈ L1,2φ (µ) and
G(w) = Eµ{G}+
∫ T
0
ψ(t, w)dBHt . (3.15)
4. Proof of Theorem 2.2. Recall that in Theorem 2.2, we consider the one
dimensional state equation (2.1) where the pay-off function of player i is of the form
(2.2).
As noted previously, we will employ the fractional Clark-Ocone formula and the
Wick calculus introduced in Section 3 to find Nash equilibria for this type of game. We
begin this development by stating a fractional version of Girsanov’s theorem, which
is given by [17].
Theorem 4.1. ([17]) Suppose T > 0 and u : [0, T ]→ IR is continuous. Suppose
further that K : [0, T ]→ IR satisfies the equation∫ T
0
K(s)φ(s, t)ds = u(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (4.1)
where φ is given by (2.7). Extend K to IR by putting K(s) = 0 outside [0, T ]. Define
the probability measure µˆ on FT by
dµˆ(w)
dµ(w)
= exp
(
−
∫ T
0
K(s)dBHs −
1
2
|K|2φ
)
. (4.2)
Then BˆHt =
∫ t
0
u(s)ds+BHt , is an fBm with respect to µˆ.
The dynamics of the state (2.1) can be written as
d(e−rtXt)− e−rt
N∑
i=1
αi(t)ui(t)dt = e
−rt
N∑
i=1
βi(t)vi(t)(Cdt + dB
H
t ). (4.3)
Let η and µˆ be defined as in (2.6); i.e.,
η(T ) =
dµˆ
dµ
= exp
(
−
∫ T
0
K(s)dBHs −
1
2
|K|2φ
)
= exp⋄
(
−
∫ T
0
K(s)dBHs
)
,
(4.4)
where K is from (2.3). Then since K solves (4.1) for u(t) = C (see Appendix Lemma
7.1) and by the fractional Girsanov formula, the process
BˆHt = Ct+B
H
t , (4.5)
is an fBm with respect to µˆ having the same Hurst parameter as the modulating
process in (2.1). Thus, the differential equation describing the flow of the state is
given in terms of BˆH as,
e−rtXt −
∫ t
0
e−rs
N∑
i=1
αi(s)ui(s)dt = x+
∫ t
0
e−rs
N∑
i=1
βi(s)vi(s)dBˆ
H
s . (4.6)
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To be able to find a Nash equilibrium, we will use the quasi- martingale approach
to stochastic control in the proof. (For another application of this approach see [18].)
We first find the best response of a player to the given strategies of other players, and
for that we will use the fractional Clark-Ocone theorem (Thm 3.10).
By (2.8) we have that e−rtXt −
∫ t
0
e−rs
∑N
i=1 αi(s)ui(s)dt ∈ L2(µˆ). And note
that by Lemma 3.9 and (2.8),
∫ t
0
e−rs
∑N
i=1 βi(s)vi(s)dBˆ
H
s , is a quasi-martingale.
Therefore we have
Eµˆ
{
e−rtXt −
∫ t
0
e−rs
N∑
i=1
αi(s)ui(s)dt
}
= x.
Now let G be given by
G = e−rTFi −
∫ T
0
e−rs
N∑
j=1
αj(s)uj(s)ds. (4.7)
Assume G ∈ L2(µˆ). Then if
Eµˆ{G} = x, (4.8)
by the fractional Clark-Ocone formula (3.15) we have
G = x+
∫ T
0
E˜µˆ
{
DsG
∣∣Fs} dBˆHs . (4.9)
If we choose vi in (4.6) such that
vi(s) =
−∑j 6=i βj(s)vj(s) + ersE˜µˆ{DsG∣∣Fs}
βi(s)
, (4.10)
then from (4.9) we see that XT = Fi.
By the above argument we can change the dynamic optimization problem of
maximizing (2.2) under the dynamics (2.1) into a static optimization problem. In
particular, given the other players’ strategies, player i wishes to solve the following
maximization problem:
Ki(x) = sup
ui,Fi
{
Eµ
{∫ T
0
ciui(t)
γi
γi
dt+
biF
γ′i
i
γ′i
}
; given that
Eµˆ

−
∫ T
0
e−rs
N∑
j=1
αj(s)uj(s)ds + e
−rTFi

 = x
}
, (4.11)
where the supremum is taken over Fi and (ui) such that
e−rTFi −
∫ T
0
e−rs
N∑
j=1
αj(s)uj(s)ds ∈ L2(µˆ). (4.12)
This optimization problem can be solved by first considering for each λi > 0 the
following unconstrained problem,
Ci(x, λ) = sup
ui,Fi

Eµ
{∫ T
0
ciui(t)
γi
γi
dt+
biF
γ′i
i
γ′i
}
+ λiEµˆ

−
∫ T
0
e−rs
N∑
j=1
αj(s)uj(s)ds+ e
−rTFi



 ,
(4.13)
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and then solving for λi from the slackness condition:
Eµˆ

−
∫ T
0
e−rs
N∑
j=1
αj(s)uj(s)ds+ e
−rTFi

 = x. (4.14)
Let us define, as before, the following random variable
ρ(t, w) = Eµ
{
η(T )
∣∣Ft}, (4.15)
where η is from (4.4). Using the fact that
Eµ{η(T )ui(t)} = Eµ{ρ(t)ui(t)}, (4.16)
we can solve (4.13) by maximizing pointwise, i.e. for each t and w, the functions,
gi(ui) =
ciu
γi
i
γi
− λiρ(t, w)e−rt
N∑
j=1
αj(t)uj , (4.17)
and hi(Fi) =
biF
γ′i
i
γ′i
− λiη(T,w)e−rTFi. (4.18)
Since 0 < γi < 1, these functions are concave, and therefore we can solve g
′
i(ui) = 0
and h′i(Fi) = 0 to find the maximizing points, which are given by,
ui(t) =
(
λiρ(t, w)e
−rtαi(t)
ci
) 1
γi−1
, (4.19)
and Fi =
(
λiη(T,w)e
−rT
bi
) 1
γ′
i
−1
. (4.20)
Since αi(t) is bounded by assumption, (4.12) is satisfied. Note that at the Nash
equilibrium Fi is independent of the player index i, i.e. Fi = F
e for all i. We will use
this condition to show that the Lagrange multipliers at the equilibrium are necessarily
linear in bi and then use the slackness condition to actually find their values. First
we will find Eµ
{
η(T )
1
γ′
i
−1
}
. Note that
η(T )
1
γ′
i
−1 = exp
(
1
1− γ′i
∫ T
0
K(s)dBHs +
1
2(1− γ′i)
|K|2φ
)
= exp
(
1
1− γ′i
∫ T
0
K(s)dBHs −
1
2(1− γ′i)2
|K|2φ
)
exp
(
2− γ′i
2(1− γ′i)2
|K|2φ
)
.
(4.21)
Since E
{
exp⋄
(∫ T
0
f(s)dBHs
)}
= 1, (4.22)
12 ERHAN BAYRAKTAR AND H. VINCENT POOR
for all f ∈ L2(µ), we have
E
{
η(T )
1
γ′
i
−1
}
= exp
(
2− γ′i
2(1− γ′i)2
|K|2φ
)
. (4.23)
Therefore using (4.20) we obtain
EFi =
(
λi
bi
) 1
γ′
i
−1
exp
(
2− γ′i
2(1− γ′i)2
|K|2φ −
rT
γ′i − 1
)
. (4.24)
It follows that
Fi = E{Fi} exp⋄
(
1
1− γ′i
∫ T
0
K(s)dBHs
)
. (4.25)
From (4.25) we see that for a Nash-equilibrium to exist we necessarily have γ′i = γ
′,
and λei = mbi. From (4) we see that m is to be found from the slackness condition:
Eµ
{∫ T
0
e−rtρ(t)
( N∑
i=1
αi(t)
(
λeiρ(t)e
−rtαi(t)
ci
) 1
γi−1
)
dt+e−rTη(T )
(
λei η(T )e
−rT
bi
) 1
γ′
i
−1 }
= x.
(4.26)
Note that by (4.4) we have the following
η(T )
γ′
γ′−1 = exp
(
γ′
1− γ′
∫ T
0
K(s)dBHs +
γ′
2(1− γ′) |K|
2
φ
)
= exp⋄
(
γ′
1− γ′
∫ T
0
K(s)dBHs
)
exp
(
γ′
2(1− γ′)2 |K|
2
φ
)
.
(4.27)
E
{
η(T )
γ′
γ′−1
}
= exp
(
γ′
2(γ′ − 1)2 |K|
2
φ
)
. (4.28)
Using Thm. 3.2 of [16] ρ(t, w) can be written as
ρ(t, w) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
ζt(s)dB
H
s −
1
2
|ζt|2φ
)
, (4.29)
where ζt is given by the following:(
(−∆)−(H−1/2)ζt
)
(s) =
(
(−∆)−(H−1/2)K)(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t,
ζt(s) = 0 s < 0 or s > t,
(4.30)
with the operator (−∆)−(H−1/2) on L2(µ) defined by (2.5).
Thus
E
{
ρ
γi
γi−1
t
}
= E
{
exp
(
γi
1− γi
∫ T
0
ζt(s)dB
H
s −
γ2i
2(1− γi)2 |ζt|
2
φ+
γi
2(1− γi) |ζt|
2
φ+
γ2i
2(1− γi)2 |ζt|
2
φ
)}
,
(4.31)
from which we conclude that
E
{
ρ(t)
γi
γi−1
}
= exp
(
γi
2(1− γi)2 |ζt|φ
)
, (4.32)
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so that m can be solved from (4.26), which leads to the following equation:
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
m
1
γi−1 b
1
γi−1
i αi(t)
γi
γi−1 e
−rt γi
γi−1 exp
( γi
2(1− γi)2 |ζt|φ
)
dt
+m
1
γ′−1 e
−rT γ′
γ′−1 exp
(
2γ′|K|φ
2(1− γ′)2
)
= x.
(4.33)
After solving for m using (4.33), then by (4.19) and (4.20) we have the final state at
the equilibrium and strategy ui for player i leading to that state, given respectively
by,
F e = m
1
γ′−1 η(T )
1
γ′−1 e
−rT
γ′−1 , (4.34)
and
uei (t) =
(
mbiαi(t)
ci
e−rtρ(t, w)
) 1
γi−1
. (4.35)
Observe that these controls are not Markovian. (In a Brownian motion setting the
controls were assumed to be Markovian at the outset so that the HJB equations for
an equilibrium solution can be developed [7], [12] and [29].)
Now we will proceed to find (vi) at the equilibrium, which is the second component
of the players’ strategies. For this we will again make use of the fractional Clark-Ocone
formula.
Suppose Ge is given by
Ge = e−rTF e −
∫ T
0
e−rs
N∑
i=1
αiu
e
i (s)ds. (4.36)
Since there is a unique adapted process ψ(t, w) such that
Ge = Eµ{Ge}+
∫ T
0
ψ(t, w)dBˆHt , (4.37)
which, from the Clark-Ocone formula, is given by
ψ(t, w) = E˜µˆ
{
DtG
e
∣∣Ft}, (4.38)
it can now be seen immediately that any adapted (vei ) that satisfies
E˜µ
{
DtG
e
∣∣Ft} = e−rt N∑
i=1
βiv
e
i (t), (4.39)
is an equilibrium strategy.
To obtain a more explicit expression, we will compute E˜µˆ{DtGe|Ft}. Using (4.34)
and (4.35), Ge is given by
Ge(T,w) = m
1
γ′−1 e
−rT γ′
γ′−1 η(T,w)
1
γ′−1−
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
αi(t)
γi
γi−1
(
mbi
ci
) 1
γi−1
e
−rt γi
γi−1 ρ(t, w)
1
γi−1 dt.
(4.40)
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To calculate the quasi-conditional expectation of the Hida derivative of Ge we will
first find it for the stochastic part of the first term on the right-hand side of (4.40).
Define R as
R = exp
(
2− γ′
(1− γ′)2 |K|
2
φ −
C
1− γ′
∫ T
0
K(s)ds
)
. (4.41)
Using the chain rule, (4.5) and (3.12), we have
E˜µˆ
{
Dtη(T )
1
γ′−1
∣∣Ft} = E˜µˆ
{
K(t)
1− γ′ η(T )
1
γ′−1
∣∣Ft
}
=
K(t)
1− γ′RE˜µˆ
{
exp⋄
(
1
1− γ′
∫ T
0
K(s)dBˆHs
) ∣∣Ft
}
=
K(t)
1− γ′R exp
⋄
(
1
1− γ′
∫ t
0
K(s)dBˆHs
)
=
K(t)
1− γ′ exp
(
1
1− γ′
∫ T
0
K(s)dBHs −
C
1− γ′
∫ T
t
K(s)ds
+
2− γ
2(1− γ2) |K|
2
φ −
1
1− γ |K1[0,t]|
2
φ
)
.
(4.42)
Now we will find the quasi-conditional expectation of the Hida derivative of the
stochastic part of second term on the right-hand side of (4.40) using (4.29). I.e.,
E˜µˆ
{
Dt
(
e
−ru γi
γi−1 ρ(u)
1
γi−1
)∣∣Ft
}
=
ζu(t)
1− γi e
−ru γi
γi−1 exp
(
1
1− γi
∫ t
0
ζu(s)dB
H
s −
C
1− γi
∫ u
t
ζu(s)ds
+
2− γi
2(1− γi)2 |ζu|
2
φ −
1
1− γi |ζu1[0,t]|
2
φ
)
.
(4.43)
Using (4.39) and (4.40) we have the result for the second component for the
players’ equilibrium strategies, and this concludes the proof of Theorem 2.2. 
5. Extension of the Wick Calculus to Arbitrary Gaussian Processes.
Although the results of the preceding sections have considered the explicit case in
which the modulator in (1.1) is fBm, these results can be extended to the situation
in which the modulator is a more general Gaussian process within sufficient regu-
larity. This requires the extension of the Wick calculus to more general Gaussian
processes. In this section, we sketch how this extension can be accomplished. The
first step in extending the fractional noise machinery introduced in Section 3 to more
general Gaussian processes is the following theorem due to Loe`ve [23] for integrating
deterministic functions with respect to second order processes :
Theorem 5.1. ([23]) Suppose that X is a zero-mean process such that E{X2t } <
∞ for all t, and denote its covariance function by R. Then, for −∞ < a < b <∞,
∫ b
a
f(t)dXt (5.1)
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exists as the L2-limit of Riemann sums if and only if
|f |2R :=
∫ b
a
∫ b
a
f(t)f(s)d2R(s, t) <∞. (5.2)
Henceforth X will denote a Gaussian process. By the Bochner-Minlos theorem, there
exists a unique probability measure on the space of tempered distributions such that
< ·, f >: Ω→ IR is a Gaussian random variable with mean 0, and variance |f |2R.
We will denote L2(µ) by L2(X) and H(X) will denote the linear space of X , i.e.
the closed subspace of L2(X) spanned by Xt for all t ∈ [a, b] (i.e. the first Wiener
chaos). As in [19] we construct Λ(R), a Hilbert space of deterministic integrable
‘functions’ isomorphic to H(X) by completing the pre-Hilbert space of step functions
S with the following inner product,
< f, g >S=
∫ ∫
f(t)g(s)d2R(t, s), (5.3)
for any f, g ∈ S. Then the integration operator defined on the set of step functions
(the integration with respect to X) can be extended to an isomorphism betweenH(X)
and Λ(R). (The elements of Λ(R) are generalized functions, i.e. distributions [30].)
As a second step we will define the Wick-integrability of a random process with
respect to a Gaussian process. This is done by using the tensor product structure of
the space L2(X). Let us define the tensor product of Hilbert spaces.
Definition 5.2. The algebraic tensor product H1 ⊗H2 of Hilbert spaces H1 and
H2 is a pre-Hilbert space with the following inner product
< h1 ⊗ h2, g1 ⊗ g2 >H1⊗H2 :=< h1, g1 >H1< h2, g2 >H2 , (5.4)
for gi, hi ∈ Hi and i = 1, 2. The closure of this pre-Hilbert space is the tensor product
of Hilbert spaces, which will still be denoted by H1 ⊗ H2. H1⊗˜H2 will denote the
symmetrized tensor product.
Then we have the following Wiener chaos isomorphism theorem.
Theorem 5.3. ([21]) ⊕p≥0H⊗˜p(X) is isomorphic to L2(X) with the unique
isomorphism Φ defined by
Φ(ξ⊗˜α11 ⊗˜...⊗˜ξ⊗˜αkk ) =
1√
p!
k∏
j=1
hαj (ξj), (5.5)
where ξi ∈ H(X) for all i are orthonormal; p = |α| = α1 + ... + αk . Here hn is the
Hermite polynomial of degree n (see [15], Appendix C ).
Note that for a random variable ξ ∈ H(X) with unit variance we have
Φ(e⊗˜ξ) = exp
(
ξ − 1
2
)
, (5.6)
where the exponential is defined by e⊗˜ξ =
∑
p≥0
ξ⊗˜p√
p!
.
We proceed as in [19], and in order to define the integral of a stochastic process
with respect to X , we first define a tensor product integral, denoted by
∫
Ft ⊗ dXt,
and its domain, denoted by Λ(R)L2(X).
Suppose SL2(X) is the pre-Hilbert space of the L
2(X) valued step functions Ft,
Ft =
N∑
i=1
Fi1(ti,ti+1], (5.7)
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for (ti, ti+1] ∈ [a, b], and Fi ∈ L2(X), equipped with the inner product
< F,G >=
∫ ∫
< Ft, Gs >L2(X) d
2R(t, s). (5.8)
Let Λ(R)L2(X) denote the completion of SL2(X). For the F ∈ SL2(X) given in (5.7)
define the integral I⊗ as
∫
Ft ⊗ dXt =
N∑
i=1
Fti ⊗ (Xti+1 −Xti). (5.9)
Since this integral is a norm preserving linear map, it has a unique extension to an
isomorphism from Λ(R)L2(X) into L
2(X) ⊗H(X). We will construct a map Ψ from
L2(X) ⊗ H(X) into L2(X) and call the composition of the two maps, Ψ(I⊗), the
stochastic integral. We start by defining the following linear map
Ψp : H
⊗˜p(X)⊗H(X)→ H⊗˜p+1(X) (5.10)
by
Ψp
((
ξ⊗˜α11 ⊗˜...⊗˜ξ⊗˜αkk
)
⊗ ξl
)
= (p+ 1)
1
2 ξ⊗˜α11 ⊗˜...⊗˜ξ⊗˜αkk ⊗˜ξl, (5.11)
where (ξi) ∈ H(X) is an orthonormal set of random variables, and α1 + ...+ αk = p.
Ψp can be extended uniquely to a bounded linear map with norm (p + 1)
1/2 from
H⊗˜p(X)⊗H(X) onto H⊗˜p+1(X).
Now define Ψ∗ as the map from ⊕p≥0H⊗˜p(X) ⊗ H(x) onto ⊕p≥1H⊗˜p(X); by
Ψ∗ = ⊕p≥0Ψp, viz. the restriction of Ψ∗ to H⊗˜p(X) ⊗H(X) is Ψp. The domain of
the operator Ψ∗ is given by
D∗ =
{
η ∈
(
H⊗˜α1(X)⊕ ...⊕H⊗˜αm(X)
)
⊗H(X) : α1 + ...+ αm <∞
}
, (5.12)
so that
∑
p≥0 ‖Ψp(ηp)‖2 <∞, where ηp is the projection of η on H⊗˜p(X)⊗H(X).
By Thm. 5.3, ⊕p≥0H⊗˜p(X) is isomorphic to L2(X). Therefore
(
⊕p≥0H⊗˜p(X)
)
⊗
H(X) is isomorphic to L2(X) ⊗ H(X). Denote this isomorphism by Φ0. Let D =
Φ0(D∗), which is a proper subset of L2(X)⊗H(X). Then define Ψ by
Ψ = Φ ◦Ψ∗ ◦ Φ−10 . (5.13)
We define the Wick product of V ∈ L2(X) and W ∈ H(X) as
V ⋄W := Ψ(V ⊗W ). (5.14)
Note that V ⋄W is in L2(X) iff V ⊗W ∈ D ⊗H(X).
The integral
∫
Ft ⋄ dXt is then defined by∫ b
a
Ft ⋄ dXt = Ψ ◦ I⊗(F ) (5.15)
for all F such that I⊗(F ) =
∫
Ft ⊗ dXt ∈ D. The set of all F ’s in the domain of
integration is denoted by Λ(R)∗L2(X). Then we have the Itoˆ representation formula as
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a result of the Multiple Wiener Integral (MWI) representation of the random variables
in L2(X) ([19]), and the fact that each MWI can be written as an iterated integral:
Theorem 5.4. ([19]) Every θ ∈ L2(X) has the following representation
θ = E{θ}+
∫ b
a
Ft ⋄ dXt, (5.16)
for an F ∈ Λ(R)∗L2(X) that is adapted to the filtration generated by X.
Now let us define the Wick product of two elements in L2(X). As a first step we
define Υp,q,
Υp,q : H
⊗˜p(X)⊗H⊗˜q(X)→ H⊗˜p+q(X), (5.17)
as
Υp,q
((
ξ⊗˜α1γ1 ⊗˜...⊗˜ξ⊗˜αkγk
)
⊗
(
ξ⊗˜β1λ1 ⊗˜...⊗˜ξ
⊗˜βl
λl
))
=
√
(p+ q)!
p!q!
ξ⊗˜α1γ1 ⊗˜...⊗˜ξ⊗˜αkγk ⊗˜ξ⊗˜β1λ1 ⊗˜...⊗˜ξ
⊗˜βl
λl
,
(5.18)
for any (ξγ) that is an orthonormal set in H(X).
On denoting Υ = ⊕p≥0 ⊕q≥0 Υp,q, we define the Wick-product of the W,V ∈
L2(X) as
W ⋄ V := Φ (Υ (Φ−1(W )⊗ Φ−1(V ))) . (5.19)
Note that L2(X) is not closed under ⋄, since the tensor product of the random vari-
ables may not be in the domain of Υ. Then one can define the Hida distribution
space, use (5.19) as the definition of the Wick-product over this space, and see that
the Wick product so defined is closed over these spaces.
The main machinery we use to develop strategies leading to a Nash equilibrium
are the Girsanov formula (the absolute continuity of the translated measure w.r.t.
the original measure), and the Clark-Ocone formula. These can be extended to more
general Gaussian modulators with sufficient regularity. The Girsanov theorem, Thm.
4.1, can be stated for an sufficiently regular Gaussian processes. (The proof of the
Girsanov theorem in [17] does not make use of the explicit expression for φ.) The
derivation of the Clark-Ocone theorem (Thm. 3.10) is done by using only the tensor
product structure of the space L2 (Thm. 5.3) and the spaces of generalized random
variables. Defining the Hida derivative and the quasi-conditional expectation operator
(w.r.t. which X is a quasi-martingale) for the Gaussian process X , we can restate the
Clark-Ocone theorem. Now replacing ζt in Thm. 2.2 by ϑt such that
E
{∫ T
0
K(s)dXs
∣∣∣∣Ft
}
=
∫ t
0
ϑt(s)dXs, (5.20)
we have a Nash equilibrium theorem for a general Gaussian process. Note that, unlike
the case of fBm we cannot in general write ϑ explicitly in terms of K. Hence, we can-
not give an explicit solution for the Nash equilibrium. A general multi-dimensional
theorem can also be restated for a multi-dimensional Gaussian process with inde-
pendent components (the components do not have to be identical) by making same
conceptual modifications as in the one-dimensional case.
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6. Conclusion. In this paper we have explicitly found Nash equilibria for stochas-
tic differential games in a non-Markovian setting. In this formalism, all the agents
observe the states, and they control the states by modifying the drift and the volatil-
ity. The agents are heterogeneous in their controls and utility functions. We have
taken the modulating process to be fractional Brownian motion, because an fBm is
versatile in modeling long-range dependence phenomena in finance and networks.
Since the diffusion in our model is modulated by a non-Markovian process, the
usual technique of finding Nash equilibria via Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations is
not available. Therefore we have made use of the fractional noise calculus to calculate
the agents’ Nash-equilibrium strategies. Although we have taken the modulating pro-
cess of the diffusions to be fBm, our results hold for more general Gaussian modulating
processes with only slight modifications to the white noise machinery.
Our results are applicable to financial markets in which stock price dynamics are
modulated with fractional Brownian motion. One of the candidate applications is
stock price modeling when each agent’s activities in the market affect the price flow
(institutional investors are such examples), or if there are transaction costs. This
work is also applicable to stochastic portfolio games, in which agents compete for a
bonus.
7. Appendix. Lemma 7.1. ([22]) Let f : [0, T ]→ IR be a continuous function
and introduce the following integral equation:∫ T
0
fˆ(s)φ(s, t)ds = f(t) for t ∈ [0, T ], (7.1)
where φ is given by (2.7). The solution to this equation is given by
fˆ(t) = − 1
dH
t
1
2
−H d
ds
∫ T
t
dww2H−1(w−t) 12−H d
dw
∫ w
0
dzz
1
2
−H(w−z) 12−Hf(z), (7.2)
where
dH = 2H(2H − 1)
(
Γ(
3
2
−H)
)2
Γ(2H − 1) cos(π(H − 1
2
)) (7.3)
Corollary 7.2. If we take f(t)=C on [0, T ] in the integral equation given by
(7.1) then the solution fˆ(t) is given by
fˆ(t) =
C
kH
t
1
2
−H(T − t) 12−H , (7.4)
where
kH = 2H(2H − 1)Γ(2− 2H)Γ(2H − 1) cos(π(H − 1
2
)). (7.5)
Proof: The proof can be found in [17], but we present it here for the sake of com-
pleteness.
fˆ(t) = − 1
dH
Ct
1
2
−H d
ds
∫ T
t
dww2H−1(w − t) 12−H d
dw
∫ w
0
dzz
1
2
−H(w − z) 12−H . (7.6)
Note that ∫ w
0 z
1
2
−H(w − z) 12−Hdz
w2−2H
= B(
3
2
,
3
2
) =
Γ
(
3
2 −H
)2
Γ(3−H) , (7.7)
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where B(·, ·) is the beta function given by
B(x, y) =
∫ 1
0
tx−1(1− t)y−1dt. (7.8)
Hence
d
dw
∫ w
0
z
1
2
−H(w − z) 12−Hdz = Γ
(
3
2 −H
)2
Γ(2−H) w
1−2H . (7.9)
Using (7.9) it is not hard to evaluate (7.6) to get (7.4). 
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